Labor Law-Duty to Bargain-Disclosure to Union of Costs of Noncontributory Group Insurance by Raimi, Burton L.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 60 Issue 3 
1962 
Labor Law-Duty to Bargain-Disclosure to Union of Costs of 
Noncontributory Group Insurance 
Burton L. Raimi 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Insurance Law Commons, and the Labor and Employment Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Burton L. Raimi, Labor Law-Duty to Bargain-Disclosure to Union of Costs of Noncontributory Group 
Insurance, 60 MICH. L. REV. 376 (1962). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol60/iss3/5 
 
This Recent Important Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law 
Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, 
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
376 MICHIGAN LAw REvmw [Vol. 60 
LABOR LAw-DUTY To BARGAIN-D1scLOsURE TO UNION OF CoSTs OF 
NoNCONTRIBUTORY GROUP INSURANCE-In the course of bargaining for a new 
contract with an employer, the union requested information regarding the 
costs and benefits of a noncontributory group health insurance program 1 
which the employer provided for its employees. Petitioner provided a 
breakdown of the plan's benefits but refused to disclose its cost. Charging 
that this refusal amounted to a violation of the employer's statutory duty 
to bargain in good faith about "wages,''2 the union procured the issuance 
of a complaint by the National Labor Relations Board. The trial ex-
aminer concluded that such costs were costs of production rather than 
wages and consequently did not have to be disclosed.3 The Board dis-
agreed and entered a cease-and-desist order. On petition to set aside the 
order, and cross-petition for enforcement, held, order set aside. Only the 
benefits of a health insurance program are emoluments of value includible 
under the term "wages," and an employer is under no duty to disclose the 
1 In a noncontributory health insurance plan the total premium is paid by the 
employer, whereas in a contributory plan a part of the premium is deducted from the 
employees' pay checks and the remainder of the cost is defrayed by the employer. 
2 NLRA § S(a) (5), amended by 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a) (5) (1958). 
a Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc., 127 N.L.R.B. 924, 937 (1960) • 
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cost of an insurance plan unless the employees contribute to the financing 
of the plan or the employer interposes cost as a ground for refusing a 
demand for increased coverage. Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc. v. NLRB, 291 
F.2d 128 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 926 (1961). 
The National Labor Relations Act provides that employers must bar-
gain in good faith with respect to "wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment."4 The act leaves the parties free to decide 
whether to bargain about aspects of the employment relationship which 
fall outside the scope of the mandatory bargaining provision even though 
they may affect the well-being of the employees.5 The difficulties encoun-
tered in distinguishing between voluntary and mandatory subjects of 
bargaining have in tum given rise to conflicts over what types of informa-
tion management must disclose to labor unions. Requests for information 
fall into two general categories analogous to the two categories of bar-
gaining. The first involves information directly related to the "mandatory" 
sphere of bargaining: e.g., "wage" data. Here the unions typically request 
such information as individual wage rates, job classifications and rates, 
incentive earnings, and the bases for merit increases. The courts have re-
quired employers to disclose such information,6 agreeing with the unions 
that such data is essential if unions are to formulate and discuss demands 
intelligently and police existing contracts.7 But, in addition, unions fre-
quently ask for such non-wage data as costs of production, sales, return 
on capital, profits, and cost-price schedules.8 In this area the courts are 
4 § 8 (d), added by 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (d) (1958). 
5 NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958). 
6 Sec, e.g., J. I. Case &: Co. v. NLRB, 253 F.2d 149 (7th Cir. 1958); Boston Herald-
Traveler Corp. v. NLRB, 223 F.2d 58 (1st Cir. 1955); NLRB v. Item Co., 220 F.2d 956 
(5th Cir. 1955); NLRB v. Whitin Mach. Works, 217 F.2d 593 (4th Cir. 1954) ; NLRB v. 
Yawman &: Erbe Mfg. Co., 187 F.2d 947 (2d Cir. 1951). At first the courts were not 
ready to say that an employer who did not disclose such information to the unions 
should be found to be bargaining in bad faith as a matter of law, but only that this 
would raise a prima facie presumption of bad faith. The presumption was rebuttable 
by the employer's showing that the information requested was not pertinent to the 
negotiations. See Pool Mfg. Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 540, 550 n.11 (1946). But with the decision 
in NLRB v. Yawman &: Erbe Mfg. Co., supra, the stage was set for the change from a 
presumption into a legal conclusion, the court stating that it was "difficult to conceive 
a case in which current or immediately past wage rates would not be relevant during 
negotiations for a minimum wage scale or for increased wages." Id. at 949. The rule 
was confirmed in NLRB v. Whitin Mach. ·works, supra, where the court said: "Refusal 
by an employer to supply such necessary information makes impossible the full develop• 
ment of collective bargaining negotiations which the statute intended to achieve." Id. 
at 594. 
7 See, e.g., J. I. Case &: Co. v. NLRB, supra note 6, at 153. See generally Di Fede, 
Employer Duty To Disclose Information in Collective Bargaining, 6 N.Y.L.F. 400 (1960); 
Sherman, Employer's Obligation To Produce Data for Collective Bargaining, 35 MINN. 
L. REv. 24 (1950) . 
B See, e.g., NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956); International Wood• 
workers of America v. NLRB, 263 F.2d 483 (D.C. Cir. 1959). See generally Symposium, 
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confronted with conflicting policy considerations. On the one hand, 
management fears that by disclosing such data it will be forced to justify 
its basic policy decisions to the unions.9 On the other, the unions argue 
that any distinction is purely arbitrary, for once apprised of this infor-
mation they will be capable of determining whether a company is able 
to pay a higher wage by cutting production costs, absorbing the increased 
wage cost, raising prices without losing its competitive position, or increas-
ing productivity.10 In light of these opposing contentions a compromise 
seems to have been reached wp._!:!reby disclosure will be required only when 
"necessity" as well as relevancy is shown. Thus, the Supreme Court has 
required a company to make known sufficient financial data to prove its 
repeated contentions that it would be unable to meet the costs of the wage 
increase requested by the union.11 But where inability to pay was not an 
issue, such disclosure has not been required.12 
Group insurance is now generally considered to be a subject of manda-
tory collective bargaining, for the financial cushion provided in the event 
of illness is regarded as an emolument of value arising from the employ-
ment relationship and therefore is a wage.13 Unions claim that employer 
costs of such programs are "wage data" which must be disclosed upon 
request. In cases involving a contributory insurance plan it has been 
held that the union is entitled to such information.14 The court in the 
principal case felt that without the presence of a deduction from take-home 
pay there was no direct connection between insurance costs and employee 
wages, construing the term "wage" to include only the value of the benefits 
derived from the plan.15 However, the Seventh Circuit has apparently 
ignored any such distinction and, without indicating whether the employees 
What Kind of Information Do Labor Unions Want in Financial Statements?, 87 J. Ac• 
countancy 368 (1949) . 
o See Sherman, supra note 7, at 34. See also NLRB v. ·wooster Div. of Borg-,Varner 
Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958). 
10 See International Woodworkers of America v. NLRB, 263 F.2d 483, 485 (D.C. Cir. 
1959) ; Symposium, supra note 8, at 368. 
11 NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956). 
12 International Woodworkers of America v. NLRB, 263 F.2d 483, 485 (D.C. Cir. 
1959) . "[W]ages and hours are the heart and core of the employer-employee relation-
ship, and information concerning existing and past wage rates and patterns is essential 
to the union to enable it to bargain intelligently. This is not necessarily so with respect 
to what the employer's records show about how much or at what cost or in what time 
he produces his goods, and how or at what cost or in what volume he sells those products." 
13 NLRB v. John S. Swift Co., 277 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1960); NLRB v. General 
Motors Corp., 179 F.2d 221 (2d Cir. 1950); W. W. Cross & Co. v. NLRB, 174 F.2d 875 
(1st Cir. 1949); Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948) ; Potlatch Forests, 
Inc. v. International Woodworkers of America, 108 F. Supp. 906 (D. Idaho 1951), afj'd, 
200 F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1953); Phelps Dodge Copper Prods. Corp., 101 N.L.R.B. 360 (1952). 
14 Stowe-Woodward, Inc., 123 N.L.R.B. 287 (1959); Skyland Hosiery Mills, Inc., 
108 N.L.R.B. 1600 (1954); Phelps Dodge Copper Prods. Corp., supra note 13. 
15 Principal case at 131. 
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contributed to the financing of the plan, has required disclosure of cost 
information solely on the belief that it was relevant wage data.16 This 
seems the better view since the employer's costs are a labor cost to him 
regardless of whether there is an additional contribution from the em-
ployee, and it would seem that in either case the employer's contribution 
directly affects the employee's total wage to the same extent and in much 
the same manner. Thus, if disclosure is to be mandatory under a con-
tributory plan, as the court in the principal case admits,17 it should be 
mandatory under a noncontributory plan as well. 
Rather than concentrating on an illusory distinction, the court should 
have focused its attention on the relevance of the information requested 
by the union to its legitimate bargaining position. The Board's opinion 
indicates that the union's request for information was based upon a desire 
to substitute one type of benefit for another.18 The union felt that since 
the bargaining unit was composed of relatively young employees it might 
be preferable to replace some or all of the retirement insurance included 
in the plan with immediate cash payments in the form of higher wages. 
Discussion of such changes in employee benefits is certainly within the 
area of mandatory bargaining, and intelligent bargaining on this matter 
by the union would seem dependent upon the information requested. The 
court's finding of a lack of a significant relationship failed to respond to 
the specific problem confronting the union. 
Burton L. Raimi 
16 NLRB v. John S. Swift Co., 277 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1960) . 
17 Principal case at 131. 
18 Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc., 127 N.L.R.B. 924, 925 (1960). 
